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representative did not even bother to cast a protest vote. Only Portugal, which still wanted a larger milk quota for the Azores, decided to cast a no-vote (Pirzio-Biroli, 2008, p. 107). Outcome It can therefore be argued that, by and large, the patterns of negotiations described so far in this chapter fit neatly into the MLGT framework. Furthermore, the reform negotiation process, as conceptualized in this chapter within the MGLT framework, can also explain the puzzling persistence of the CAP with all its intendant problems. In the end, exogenous influences and ongoing bargaining at all three levels resulted in policy making where the most important question—why should farmers still receive rents and how to progressively end this?—was not asked. The closest that question came to being addressed was when the French and Germans were discussing what later became the Franco-German deal over enlargement and the budget (which included limitations on the nominal growth of the CAP budget). This shows that not only does policy-making in multi-level games fail to produce rational, benevolent, welfare- maximizing behaviour, it can also boil down to simple pork-barrelling when it comes to coalition building. After all, transfers to farmers under the newly created Single Farm Payment (SFP) generate no obvious benefits to society (Hill 2012, 154). Much of the money is diverted to people who are unlikely to need it but who might be good lobbyists, or at least be able to hire people of that profession. An analysis by Oxfam (2004, 2) identified that the major beneficiaries of the SFP in the United Kingdom include many land-owning members of the nobility and the wealthy bourgeoisie. It can surely be argued that these people do not experience such low standards of living that the rest of society should intervene to help them out. Furthermore, the largest beneficiaries of the 50