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serves its purpose. Analysis showed that the main culprit to be blamed for the absence of CAP reform is still the close relationship between national governments and their respective national farmers’ lobby. It was also shown that this connection does not have to exist in all member states. Since qualified majority voting is used to make decisions about the CAP reform in the Council, one or two larger member states (where domestic coalition includes farmers) can block the CAP reforms with the help of few smaller net beneficiary member states. As Mahe, Naudet and Roussillon-Montfort have pointed out, “such a situation does not provide an adequate framework for virtuous decision-making of EU institutions” (Mahe, Naudet and Roussillon-Montfort 2010, 105). Theoretical insights from the MTR process indicate that the CAP is likely to keep farmers on welfare—to use Knudsen’s (2009) term. Only specific instruments of rent paying are likely to change. Major or even radical changes to the CAP are unlikely to gain enough support within a sufficient number of member states because governments rely on their domestic coalitions, which may include farmers’ interests. Alternatively, they might be purely concerned with the budget balance of their country, knowing that net beneficiary status is more likely to secure re- election than net contributor’s status which the state might find itself in if radical CAP reform would redistribute resource flows between member states. Even the Commission might also have an alternative agenda such as writing its member’s name into history by securing timely enlargement of the union. Therefore, the EU is likely to ‘muddle through’ by making small, incremental changes to the CAP. These small reforms would have the aim of re-legitimatization of the CAP in the eyes of the general public. Aggregate welfare of society will not be a major goal in farm politics in the EU any time soon. In the absence of credible side payment 70