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international level agreements are now also slightly less likely as a result. However, should the deal be reached at the DDR, it is now likely to be more favourable to the EU as its community level constraints increased its chief negotiator’s reservation value. More research, however, would be required to determine the exact impact of the EP’s increased power on the future reform. The use of OLP obviously makes reforms less likely if the EP wants less reform than the Commission does. Outcomes of community level negotiations will now also depend on the bargaining powers of various actors who are represented in the Conciliation Committee (Crombez, Knops and Swinnen 2012, 337). As for the EP’ there is a good reason to suspect that it will be less reform-minded than the Commission. Crombez et al. (2012) examined the CVs of the 44 full members of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) and found that the majority of the MEPs are “former agricultural ministers or secretaries of state, agricultural advisors, farmers’ unionists, members of farming associations, doctors in agricultural studies or farmers themselves” (340). Perhaps it is this revelation that has led Christilla Roederer-Rynning (2010) to call COMAGRI “a conservative forum welded to the defence of vested interests” (119). Intuitively, the EP’s enhanced role could be placed into the MLGT similarly to the national chief negotiators, in the sense that the MEPs also need to secure their re-elections and satisfy special interests back home. Like national administrations, they do not have to face the tough international trade negotiations. On the other hand, the EP as a whole is—to a certain degree— responsbible to voters like national chief executives are. The latter are (besides returning favours to narrow special interests) forced to concern themselves with the general welfare of society too—at least to a certain extent—, in order to maximize re-election chances. If, and why, this dynamics plays itself out less when it comes to the EP and the CAP reform, should be further researched. Probability probing indicates that rational ignorance of the voters and 67