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explain why the Commission was so interested in turning headage payments into a flat-rate decoupled single farm payment (Daugbjerg 2009, 405-406). However, there were those who did not view international pressure as a valid reason for reforms. Decoupling was opposed by France and Spain (before defection), who contested the need to consider the international dimension altogether. They came up with a tactical argument that perfectly fits the theoretical foundations laid down previously: French and Spanish representatives defended the concerns of their domestic farmers’ organisations by arguing that the EU should not pursue unilateral reforms before the EU’s trading partners, essentially the United States, did the same (Garzon 2006, 108). For French and Spanish representatives, unilateral reform was like unilateral disarmament, reflecting Paarlberg’s (1997) theoretical insight from MLGT that “Internationalizing a reform debate gives domestic rent seekers (e.g., farm lobbies) a potentially attractive means to shift blame for their rent-seeking conduct onto foreigners” (423-424). But why did the EU choose to reform the CAP instead of resisting the pressure? Or more precisely, why did the Council finally agree to a reform that clearly took international negotiations into account (after all, other directions were available)? Perhaps the best answer to this question is that the EU would have been locked into defending a position which could not withstand the pressure against export subsidies and domestic support. The Cairns group of agricultural exporters (i.e. Australia, Canada, Argentina), supported by the United States, gave priority to the ‘core’ agenda (market access, domestic support, export subsidies). There was no way that the EU could compensate international negotiation partners in return for accepting the pre-MTR CAP. Without reform, there might not have been any ZOPA left for future trade talks. As for the unilateral disarmament charge, the most likely cause for pre-emptive reforms may be found in the strategy adopted by the Commission in international negotiations. Instead of 42