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11 most important remaining topics was the introduction (and the level of) direct payments and quotas for the new member states. However, Romano Prodi’s Commission had made timely enlargement one of its top priorities (Swinnen 2008, 148) and this forced the Commission, as chief negotiator with the CEECs, to find a solution that would both satisfy the pro-CAP-reform member states of the EU15 and provide a solution that would not cause resentment in CEECs or a delay in the accession of the CEECs. The latter was a possibility if the CEECs were 12 forced to choose either accession with no CAP monies or no accession but a continuation of 13 negotiations that might eventually lead to a better outcome . Another major issue was the distribution of the financial burden of accession within the then currently legislated financial framework for 2000–06. The candidate states, needless to say, were asking for full payments from the CAP and the structural funds, while those members states of the EU15 that were going lose out from the diversion of funds and the increased financial burden (net contributors and current beneficiaries of the structural funds) were obviously opposed (Swinnen 2008, 150). For the pro-reform camp, not extending direct payments to the new member states promised to bring double gains, as long as it did not derail the enlargement process. Firstly, it would have reduced concerns about the EU’s financial sustainability. But doing so would not have necessarily decreased current expenditure and distribution of monies between member states. Most likely, not extending direct payments to the new member states would have meant that the new member states would have been allocated funds of similar magnitude for other projects, such as those falling under the cohesion policy or rural development. These alternative 11 Another hot topic was the desire of the CEEC countries to obtain a limited duration exception in the purchasing rights of foreigners to agricultural land to avoid having foreigners buying up too much valuable agricultural land. 12 Such developments would have reflected MLGT’s predictions that if one party imposed excessively harsh conditions on another, though it may obtain the consent of the opposing chief negotiator, this chief negotiator might not be able to ratify the agreement later at home. 13 It should be kept in mind that acceding member states already faced, for example, closed labour markets during the transition period. It is difficult to estimate where another concession could have been extracted from acceding CEEC, but what is clear is that it would have caused resentment and possibly even delays. 38