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organisations. While it ‘greening’ sounds good in principle, these organizations, as Bureau (2012) points out, often see the greening proposals as just another justification of “continuation of direct payments, which are largely harmful to the environment, whereas serious reform would require reallocating portions of the budget to the provision of public goods” (318). It can be therefore speculated that national chief executives would find it difficult to build credible domestic coalitions in support of the ‘greening’ ideas and this, in turn, means the Commission is unlikely to be able to push through reform plans falling under this scenario. Since it is the Commission (as the chief negotiator at the international levels) that has to face the consequences and possible retaliation at the WTO if ‘greening’ turns into hidden protectionism, it is unlikely to be overly dedicated to this scenario either. Re-focusing the CAP on the Rural Development scenario In the third, re-focus scenario, total budget of the CAP would be reduced altogether. All current market support instruments 22 abolished and all current direct payments would be progressively—in order to avoid ‘hard landing’ for the farmers who are dependent on them— phased out during the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The focus of the Rural Development policy would be restricted to environmental concerns and the climate crisis. This means even the refocus scenario would not abolish the CAP altogether and most of the funding freed from the direct payments would be transferred to Rural Development. This would, of course, bring with it substantial redistribution of the CAP budget between Member States (The Commission 2011, 44). There are, however, two major problems with this scenario. Firstly, 22 The only exception would be the disturbance clauses that could be only used when severe crises such natural disaster, catastrophic draught or man‐induced conflict appears. 61