Page 60 - Microsoft Word - CEU_MA_Thesis_ARDI_PRIKS_FINAL_v1.3.docx

Like direct payments, Rural Development funding (which would be kept at the existing level of the EU as whole) would be redistributed between member states according to “policy objectives” (The Commission 2011, 43), namely environment and climate crisis objectives. As with direct payments, redistribution entails some difficult bargaining at the Community level with a lot of vested domestic interests playing a role in the outcome, if agreement for the integration scenario can be reached in the first place. The latter is unlikely to happen, however, as proposals towards this scenario are likely to stumble upon fierce opposition from too many actors at the same time. Despite the fact that the Commission has explicitly mentioned strengthening of farmers’ organizations (to extort rents from the middle-men in the future, instead of taxpayers), most member states’ agricultural lobbies still oppose the greening that this scenario would bring with it. In particular the “ecological focus”, which often relates to the unpopular set aside requirement, is seen to bring undesirable negative productivity shock (Bureau 2012, 318). Also, from the national farm lobbies perspective, no agreement on the reform, would be, cetris paribus, more desirable than giving up current rents only to start extorting them again out from the middle-men. The non-agricultural business lobby would be hostile to this scenario’s proposals because of its dangerous implication for international trade negotiations. Regressing back to the market instruments—even if they would be pursued under the aegis of environmental concerns or in the name of fighting the climate crisis—can cause further gridlocks at the international level. After all, it can be easily conceived how the CAP’s budget could be used much more cost-effectively elsewhere in the world to pursue these goals. This sheds serious doubt on the sincerity of the EU when it tries to justify its agricultural policy. In addition, as much as ‘green’ prices would be passed through middle-men to consumers, higher food prices would also put pressure on wages (particularly in poorer member states)— a clearly undesirable effect form the employers’ perspective as real wages would decline. Finally, there is little faith in the ‘greening’ from environmental non-governmental 60