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influential 1988 essay in International Organization. In his essay, Putnam addressed Webb’s critique by laying down the theoretical framework that would connect international relations with comparative politics. This was particularly appealing for international relations scholars because it allowed them to overcome the level of analysis problem. That is, to overcome the problem of parallel conceptualization and systematization of international, domestic and individual actors’ behaviour. Putnam’s two-level games approach also offered an alternative way to explain governance failures in the international arena—something that was missing from earlier works by Raiffa (1982) and Schelling (1980 [1960]). The essence of Putnam’s (1988, 434) theory is that many international negotiations—such as those conducted in the Council of Ministers to decide the EU’s policies—can be thought of as a two-level game. Within a member state, various domestic interest groups try to influence the position that their representatives—such prime ministers—take on the international arena. These representatives are called chief negotiators. The chief negotiator can be one person, such as the prime minister or the president of the country, who has the final word over the negotiation position adopted by his or her subordinates. Alternatively, the chief negotiator can be a larger group of people, such as the inner circle of the governing coalition or the country’s chief executive’s administration which decides the bargaining position collectively. As for methodological individualism, the chief negotiator ultimately tries to maximize their own utility, which (among other things) can be expressed in material wealth, power and prestige. In the case of elected officials in the EU member states, this personal utility maximization is almost always expressed in the attempt to secure one’s own re-election. This means that when the head of government is negotiating at the European Council or giving guidelines to their country’s permanent representatives in Brussels, they have two clear goals in mind. Firstly, they will try to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures. This is necessary to form a coalition in support of the domestic ratification of the international agreement that the 14