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chief negotiator. The mandate and oversight of the chief negotiator by the domestic sub-actors such as political parties of governing coalition or special interest groups that form the voter- or financial donor base of the chief negotiators differ. Some chief negotiators are kept on a short leash, while others are able to operate with a lot of freedom and in relative obscurity (which prevents opposing interests from mobilizing). Secondly, the EU member states differ in their domestic decision making procedures. Some chief negotiators have to ratify international agreements with parliamentary super majority while others get away with absolute majority. While the CAP reforms have so far not fallen into the following category, it is theoretically possible that in the future a larger reform has to be ratified in one (Ireland) or more member states by plebiscite. Ratification procedures reveal which particular subgroups (committees) or individuals (committee chairs or party leaders) are pivotal for a successful ratification. The higher the consensus required for a successful ratification, the longer the list of actors who have to be included in the pro-ratification domestic coalition. Crucial for the CAP reform, “many veto players make significant policy changes difficult or impossible” (Tsebelis 2002, 7). Intuitively, the nature and outcome of the international negotiations also depend on the number of issues and the number of parties. When the negotiations involve only one issue, say the level of direct payments paid out in one or another member state within the EU at a given budget constraint, then the central issue is to distribute a fixed amount. The threshold of that fixed amount is known as the best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA) or “a reservation value” (sometimes “reserve value”), the limit of which is acceptable for the party (Mayer 2010, 49). If there are only two actors, then agreement can be reached only when both actors’ reservations values are in the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). All points—which can be thought of as various distributions of the CAP spending between member states—in the ZOPA represent situations where actors’ utilities from a successful agreement are more than the value of both parties' reservation values (Mayer 2010, 49). A no deal situation might be represented 17