Page 21 - Microsoft Word - CEU_MA_Thesis_ARDI_PRIKS_FINAL_v1.3.docx

One Issue, Two levels This simple bargaining, however, becomes more complex if another level (domestic level) is added to the game—that is, actors at the international level are no longer unitary. In this case, as Putnam (1988) elaborates, chief negotiators “representing two organizations meet to reach an agreement between them, subject to the constraints that any tentative agreement must be ratified by their respective organizations” (435). Tsebelis (2002) elaborates how various domestic political actors through domestic institutional arrangements can have veto power over external negotiations. National chief negotiators—usually heads of government, or their agents—may end up negotiating an international agreement that is acceptable to the nation as whole, but unacceptable to some special interests with a nation. If these special interests have a representation in parliament and their political party is part of the government coalition then parliamentary representatives of these special interests are likely to use their veto power (in extreme cases by joining the opposition in a vote-of-non-confidence on the executive) to prevent ratification of an unacceptable international agreement. In one issue space, this simply narrows down the ZOPA, as shown below in Figure 2. Figure 2: ZOPA with two actors (one unitary actor and one internally divided actor) and one issue Origin of actor A (zero Origin of actor B (zero utility for A) utility for B) Increasing utility of actor A Increasing utility of actor B Reservation value of Reservation value of subactor A 1 unitary actor B Reservation value of The zone of possible subactor A 2 agreement (ZOPA) 21