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“the relative size of the respective [international level] win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain” (Putnam 1988, 440). Indeed, Figure 4 shows that if the external negotiation is largely distributive, then internal division can enhance A’s bargaining positions because many of A’s inferior outcomes are now outside the ZOPA. Schelling (1980 [1960], 22-23) emphasises that national chief negotiators might try to manipulate their reservation schedule by intentionally promoting or even institutionalizing internal division. However, from the CAP reform perspective, national executives are unlikely to call for domestic intuitional overhaul simply to gain bargaining advantage at the CAP reform table, but the chief negotiators are in a good position to exploit their internal divisions even if they have no control over them (Putnam 1988, 440). A skilful chief negotiator of A could actually increase their share of gains in both issues compared to the situation where he or she was representing a unitary actor. This is so because the structural constraints imposed on A’s internal division might not be fully transparent to its negotiation partner(s), the chief negotiator of B in this case (Mayer 2010, 61). On the other hand, if the external game is largely integrative, then bargaining advantages that internally divided actors might gain (due to their domestic configurations) are likely to be offset by foregone opportunities for joint gains, particularly if both parties are divided (Mayer 2010, 55-56)! This problem, as will be shown throughout the thesis, is especially salient in the case of the CAP reform negotiations. 25