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Figure 4: Two Actors (one unitary, one internally divided), Two Issues, Two levels Y Unitary A Reservation A1 Schedule Reservation Schedule A2 Reservation Schedule Contract Curve ZOPA (A and B) Unitary B Reservation Schedule X Adopted from Mayer (2010, 52) As can be seen from the above figure, the ZOPA has decreased considerably. What is more, only a short section of the Pareto efficient contract curve lies now within the ZOPA and, depending on the exact configuration, might be outside of it entirely. In the latter case, when the agreement is not on the contract curve, the utility of at least one sub-national actor could be increased by dividing X and Y differently between nation A and B. Hence, internal divisions can cause international negotiations to end with agreements that are inefficient. Efficiency loss could be particularly severe if veto player is otherwise numerically and economically marginal—for example, when such a special interest group represents only few percent of the population and fewer percent of the total economic output. 26