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Figure 3: Two Unitary Actors, Two Issues, One level A’s share of X Y Unitary A Reservation A1 Reservation Schedule A’s share of Y Schedule Iso‐utility curves ZOPA Contract Curve (A and B) B’s share of Y Unitary B Reservation Schedule X B’s share of X Based on Mayer (2010, 52) and Putnam (1988, 447) Two Issues, Two levels Similar to the one issue model, when one actor is internally divided into two veto players, then iso-utility curves no longer represent nations’ welfare maximization. This is so because the national chief negotiators are now forced to satisfy the interests of one or another narrow special interests group instead of the nation as whole. In the international negotiation space, this theoretical relaxation increases the reservation schedule and reduces the ZOPA. However, 24