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representing the nations A and B are negotiating over two issues, X and Y. In the current case, the iso-utility curves of the chief negotiators coincide with what would be welfare maximizing of their nations. The shape of the iso-utility curve shows how concessions in one issue can be traded off for gains in another issue. The shapes the iso-utility curves shown in this example imply that negotiators prefer balanced solutions (they gain something in both issue areas) to corner solutions (where they triumph in one issue area entirely and gain nothing in another). One of these iso-utility curves forms a reservation curve for each nation. Any combination of X and Y that is not at least on the reservation curve would be rejected by the chief negotiators because the utility from BATNA would be higher than from such an agreement. Hence, these reservation curves define the ZOPA area. Points connecting Pareto efficient agreements—that is, agreements whereby neither nation’s utility can be further increased by changing to another combination of X and Y without reducing the utility that its negotiating partner can get from its share of X and Y—define the contract curve. Mayer (2010, 53) notes that, while in theory, unitary negotiating actors should reach an agreement that lies on the contract curve, they often fail to do this because of asymmetric information and concerns about relative gains. Figure 3 shows equal distribution of relative gains. 23