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Mayer clarifies that the precise impact of the internal division depends on two elements. The first one is the existence of side payments. If side payments are given to a party with the largest reservation value (A1 in above figure 2) then winners compensate 'losers' and the ZOPA increases. Side payments are particularly important if a subactor with veto power has such reservation value that there is no ZOPA. In other words, special interests in one country might demand more concessions from another country than that country is willing to give. The second element determining the size of ZOPA is information available to actors. Actors are much more likely to reach an agreement when they have precise information about the nature and extent of the internal constraints faced by their negotiation partner (Mayer 2010, 51). Two Issues, One level In reality, negotiations are rarely conducted with only one topic. Whether parties want it or not, side-topics cannot by passed. For example, the EU’s agricultural subsidies and allocation of the EU budget between member states is invariably linked to budget negotiations and distribution of budget burdens. It is sometimes even better to conceptualize side-payments as just another negotiation topic or issue. The second issue might actually be much more salient for the parties concerned than the 6 research focus of this thesis -agricultural policy reform. When there are only two issues and two players at the international level, then negotiation space can be displayed graphically as is done in the following Figure 3. In that figure, two rational benevolent chief negotiators 6 The creation of industrial goods common market—and not the often fought over CAP—was most likely much more important for the nascent EC decision‐makers in 1950s and 1960s. 22