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chief negotiator is negotiating. Furthermore, satisfying sufficiently many and/or powerful domestic pressure groups makes re-election most likely and may, in some cases, bring in other ‘benefits’ too. Secondly, chief negotiators try to minimize the internal negative consequences of external developments, which are not under their control. This is most obvious in global climate change related international negotiations, but increasingly also describes international negotiations related to domestic macro-economic governance. Due to the interconnectedness, “neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign” (Putnam, 434). The final important characteristic of level-games is that they do not take place in consecutive turns. That is, negotiations do not take place so that the international negotiating position of country is initially domestically decided and then defended immutably abroad. Instead, negotiations are always ongoing at all levels. Developments (particularly new information about negotiation partners and their internal struggles) at the international level can have an impact on the other countries’ domestic actors. These impacts or some exogenous influences can result in the reshuffling of the domestic coalition that the chief negotiator is drawing support from. Hence, events occurring at one level of the negotiation reverberate to other levels. This reverberation means that strategies and outcomes at different levels of the game simultaneously affect each other. While Putnam advances only two-level games theory (international level and domestic level), a broader MLGT, which may contain more than two levels, has been built using Putnam’s framework as the foundation. This MLGT has been widely used to analyse various historical events and bargains. For example, H. Richard Friman (1993), Leonard J. Schoppa (1993), Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendortf (1997), Frederick W. Mayer (1991) and John S. Odell (2000) have used it to analyse international trade. Jean K. Winn (2009) applied it to the political economy of modern information and communication technology, Howard P. Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy (1992) to international debt, Houda Haffoudhi (2005) on international 15   
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